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Language, Listening and Learning: Critically Reflective Accountability for 
INGOs 
Abstract 
This paper examines the emergence of two waves of reforms across the international NGO (INGO) 
sector in accountability discourse and practice. The first wave accountability model was narrowly 
framed around the demands of powerful stakeholders such as donors and governments, whereas 
the second wave was a more holistic approach that prioritised the obligations of INGOs towards 
their ‘beneficiaries’. It is argued that INGOs should embed critically reflective accountability by 
pursuing further reforms in three thematic areas. Firstly, words like ‘beneficiary’ should be expunged 
from the language of accountability, since it is encoded with norms that implicitly undermine the 
rights of people and communities to expect that INGOs should be answerable for their actions. 
Secondly, listening to marginalised stakeholders should be facilitated by inclusive discursive arenas 
that enable and empower people ‘to speak and be heard’. Lastly, INGOs need to use feedback to 
become a learning organisation, and collaborate with peers to engender a culture of reflective 
learning across the sector.  
Points for Practitioners 
The paper offers several policy recommendations structured around the three core themes of the 
paper. These include suggestions for the training of field-staff, issues concerning the design of 
participatory exercises, and proposals for a strengthened regime of peer-regulation.  
Key Words 
Accountability, civil society, development, regulation, INGO. 
 
Fifteen years ago, in a widely cited article, Jessica Mathews heralded a ‘power shift’ in politics from 
nation-states to non-state actors, exemplified by the ‘unprecedented influence’ of NGOs (1997). 
What then seemed like a contentious statement is now a commonplace observation.  The increased 
leverage of INGOs on the world stage has led some to raise serious concerns about their credibility 
as actors of conscience, claiming that they are not sufficiently answerable to those that they claim to 
represent and serve (Anderson & Reiff, 2004). Indeed, the One World Trust has found in 
comparative surveys that several INGOs score less well on basic measures of accountability than 
organisations that are popular targets of INGO censure, such as the World Bank and Royal Dutch 
Shell (Blagescu & Lloyd, 2006;  Lloyd et al., 2008). 
Some prominent INGOs have responded to these criticisms with concerted efforts to address their 
accountability deficits through a variety of mechanisms, including peer regulation and community 
consultations. The emergent INGO accountability regime signals recognition in the sector that it is 
imperative to re-establish its credentials and legitimacy if it is to continue to occupy a privileged 
position in international politics. It has been noted that these reforms have not attracted much 
academic attention; an odd omission in an otherwise lively field of research (Collingwood & Logister, 
2005: 176; Piewitt et al., 2010: 239). The relevant scholarly work that does exist tends to be 
clustered in development studies, or in the accounting and auditing literature (e.g. Ebrahim, 2003a; 
Jordan & Van Tuijl, 2000; Kilby, 2006; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008, 2010). International public 
administration would seem to be the ideal disciplinary base to further develop academic expertise in 
INGO accountability. It is uniquely placed to house research into different dimensions of the topic, 
such as empirical analysis of the functioning of the policy process, normative critiques of decision-
making; and comparative case studies of INGO governance in different countries. This article aims to 
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promote interest in INGO accountability amongst scholars in the administrative sciences by 
proposing a theoretical framework to orientate future empirical research. It outlines a typology to 
aid conceptualisation of the different modalities of INGO accountability, and introduces the 
categories of commission accountability and dialogic accountability to the literature, which capture 
important aspects of an INGOs’ relationship with its stakeholders. The typology provides a 
framework for the latter half of the article, which critiques current practice and proposes an agenda 
for change.   
The article proceeds as follows. First, it defines key terms and considers the drivers for INGO reform. 
Second, it discusses early attempts by INGOs to improve their accountability, which tended to 
privilege the demands of powerful stakeholders such as donors and governments. Third, it examines 
how this bias was addressed by a subsequent wave of reforms, which reinforced the responsibilities 
of INGOs towards their ‘beneficiaries’, their staff and members, and peer organisations. Fourth, it 
proposes specific policy reforms, separated into the themes of language, listening and learning. For 
example, it is suggested that the term ‘beneficiaries’ is replaced by ‘primary stakeholder’ (i.e. 
language); that aid workers undertake periodic critical reflection of their personal role in 
reproducing power disparities between the INGO and communities (listening); that a ‘gold standard’ 
award is introduced to recognise good accountability practice, and that staff are encouraged to use a 
variety of formal and informal networking opportunities (learning). The paper concludes by arguing 
in favour of a critically reflective model of accountability, which better enables INGOs to be 
accountable to the communities that they purport to serve. 
 
INGO Accountability Deficits 
INGOs are Northern-based civil society actors that are not principally defined by commercial motives 
and are ‘geared to improving the quality of life for disadvantaged people’ (Vakil, 1997: 2060). They 
are often categorised as either advocacy organisations or service providers, but recent years have 
witnessed a trend for the latter to become more cause-oriented (Lindeberg & Bryant, 2001). The 
literature also sometimes elides the distinction between progressive and illiberal INGOs. It has 
frequently been observed that civil society enthusiasts tend to assume the altruistic motives of 
INGOs and their positive contribution to public life (Anderson & Reiff, 2004). This paper focuses 
exclusively on Northern-based organisations that endorse politically and socially progressive norms, 
that have a particular interest in the welfare of peoples in the global South, and that aim to promote 
societal change. These INGOs incur profound accountability responsibilities towards peoples that are 
most affected by their activities and sense of mission. Moreover, it seems reasonable to presume 
that these organisations have a stake in critically reflective accountability practices orientated 
towards societal transformation.  
INGOs have been portrayed as a ‘magic bullet’ in neoliberal discourse for a gamut of social and 
political problems (Edwards & Hulme, 1996). It is argued that they are better skilled and more 
capable and efficient at delivering welfare services than state providers (Lewis, 2007: 41) - albeit this 
claim can often be read as an attempt to justify cutbacks, rather than a true reflection of INGO 
competence. INGOs have been encouraged to compensate for the retrenchment of government 
provision, and have been privileged as a conduit of aid by international development donors. They 
provide essential services for countless millions, in developed countries as well as the most 
desperate and dangerous environments. It has been estimated that INGOs distribute at least $7 
billion each year, exceeding the amount dispensed by the UN (Keane, 2003: 8). 
INGO political authority is bolstered by public opinion. They are the most trusted institutions 
worldwide, in comparison to government, media and business (Edelman, 2011). Nonetheless, it 
cannot be assumed that the public will continue to hold INGOs in high regard. Unease has been 
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expressed in some quarters that their increasingly assertive use of soft power is not being 
sufficiently matched with observance of the demands of political responsibility (Gibelman & Gelman, 
2001). Some of the most well-known INGOs have come under fire for poor performance and lack of 
transparency; such as Nature Conservatory, the biggest environmental INGO in the world, which 
attracted an avalanche of media and congressional criticism for questionable financial practices 
(Birchard, 2005). The Lancet recently provoked media attention by publishing a scathing editorial 
about the performance of INGOs in Haiti. It claimed that ‘humanitarianism is no longer the ethos for 
many organisations in the aid industry’, and that INGOs were ‘obsessed with raising money’ and 
‘media coverage as an end in itself’, rather than the best interests of earthquake survivors (2010). 
High profile NGOs are at least partly accountable by reputational damage through bad publicity. 
Plenty of smaller NGOs operate below the ‘media radar’ but are no less susceptible to malpractice 
and mismanagement, as illustrated by the sexual abuse of children by aid workers (Csáky, 2008) and 
the chaotic relief effort in Indonesia following the 2004 tsunami (IFRC, 2005).  
Misgivings have also been expressed about whether INGOs are capable of representing marginalised 
peoples when they are typically staffed by an elite; in Scholte’s words, ‘middle-aged adults, 
professional and propertied classes, men, Northern countries, whites, Christian heritages, and urban 
dwellers.’ (2002: 296) The gulf in backgrounds and lived experiences may partly explain why 
representations of the ‘needy’ in INGO literature can be insensitive and demeaning – ironically 
compounding the disenfranchisement of the people it portrays (Nyamugasira, 1998). Smillie has 
criticised ‘highly competitive fund-raising appeals, unsubstantiated INGO claims and unremitting 
horror stories from the South’ for leading to more public ignorance in the North and ‘a growing 
antipathy toward any kind of aid but for the most heart-wrenching plights.’ (1996: 188)  
Persistent tales of incompetence and impropriety will corrode the moral capital of INGOs – their 
prime source of political legitimacy. It is in the interest of the whole sector to engage with the drive 
for accountability to ward against the ‘contagion effect’, whereby a scandal involving a ‘rogue’ INGO 
precipitates a crisis of confidence that contaminates the reputation of others that are blameless. 
INGOs have a moral imperative, as ostensibly conscience-driven organisations, to strive to meet the 
highest standards of probity. An accountability regime has slowly emerged in recent years that aims 
to address this challenge. NGO accountability is defined in an oft-cited article as the ‘process by 
which an NGO holds itself openly responsible for what it believes, what it does and what it does not 
do in a way which shows it involving all concerned parties and actively responding to what it learns.’ 
(Slim, 2002, original emphasis) 
INGOs have not always engaged with the accountability agenda of their own volition. Jordan 
observes that ‘most NGOs address the issue of accountability when the political space within which 
they operate is somehow under threat.’ (2007: 155) Self-regulation is a useful tactic to evade the 
threat of government-imposed regulation, which appeared to be the impetus for the establishment 
of NGO associations in Kenya, India, and Uganda (ibid.). INGO accountability mechanisms are also 
frequently introduced in response to donor demands. In both instances, INGO actions are motivated 
by strategic needs to placate governments and donors to protect their autonomy from external 
regulation and maintain their funding base. This reactive approach may appear to promote 
organisational survival, but it paradoxically undermines the most important component of INGO 
accountability: the primacy of those closest to their missioni. 
This paper contends that INGOs must resist the ‘capture’ of the accountability agenda by powerful 
stakeholders. They should make proactive efforts to shape accountability discourse and practise in 
accordance with the needs and desires of the communities that they aim to serve, which at times 
might conflict with the expectations of donors and governments. The values at the heart of the 
mission should consistently supersede other demands; otherwise it will be difficult for INGOs to 
maintain their integrity. The overriding aim of INGO accountability mechanisms should be to 
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encourage critical reflection on the organisation’s role in promoting societal transformation 
(Ebrahim, 2007). This can only be achieved if accountability practice is primarily driven by dialogue 
with those most affected by their actions. INGOs need to secure authentication of their advocacy 
strategy and assess the quality of their service provision through consultation with the grassroots, 
and ensure that they recognise and learn from their failings. Although many INGOs profess to adopt 
such an approach, this paper argues that a meaningful cultural shift has not been fully realised due 
to countervailing pressures and attitudinal factors.    
An overview of key drivers of the accountability agenda follows, which in recent years has resulted in 
two waves of reforms. The terms of the debate range from an accountability culture heavily 
influenced by standards imported from the business sector, to a more reflective approach that 
prioritises the expressed preferences of communities. This is a broad thematic summary of 
prevailing trends across leading INGOs. The structure and content of the analysis is represented by 
the table below. It must be stressed that INGOs are hugely diverse in their governance, strategy, 
operating procedures, geographical reach, size and resources, and not all have progressed in the 
same direction at the same rate. 
 
 Type of accountability Main stakeholder/s 
 
Characteristics 
First Wave 
Accountability 
Fiscal Donors 
 
Accountability narrowly-
conceived. 
Shaped by short-term, 
campaign-specific targets. 
Effectuated by significant 
penalties for non-
compliance.  
Legal Governments 
 
Commission Commissioning agent 
Second Wave 
Accountability 
 
 
Dialogic (external) ‘Beneficiaries’, 
partners. 
 
Accountability broadly-
conceived. 
Aspires to long-term vision 
of social change. 
Espouses commitment to 
participatory decision-
making and organisational 
learning. 
Dialogic (internal) Members, 
staff. 
 
Peer Peer INGOs 
 
The First Wave of Accountability Reform 
The first wave of accountability reforms aimed to strengthen INGO governance by improving legal 
compliance and delivering good financial management. It was primarily focused on the right of 
donors – whether governmental, corporate, institutional or individual – to demand transparency 
about the expenditure and investment of funds. Greater efforts were made to provide information 
about how donations were linked to narrowly-defined campaign outcomes (narrowly-defined 
because the outcomes were not designed with meaningful consultation with grassroots 
communities, as discussed below). Most major INGOs now make their financial reports accessible to 
the wider public through their websites. This can be categorised as fiscal accountability. Fiscal 
accountability tends to be heavily embedded in INGO governance; largely because it is underpinned 
by the sanction of the withdrawal of funds if donors are not satisfied with the disclosure of 
information.  
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INGOs are also obliged to be accountable to political authorities in the territories within which they 
operate. Legal accountability mainly applies to the domestic sphere, and so is varied in design and 
application. NGOs in some states are required to abide by specific criteria in order to access certain 
privileges. For example, the Philippine government only grants tax-deductable status for donations 
that have been accredited by the Philippines Council for NGO Certification for meeting minimum 
standards of fiscal transparency and accountability. The Council provides training, capacity-building 
workshops and resources to help embed improvements in accountability practices, which has helped 
to raise sector-wide standards in a country once notorious for endemic corruption amongst non-
profits. Legal accountability also has invidious effects. Some government-sponsored regulatory 
initiatives have been accused of being politically–motivated assaults on advocacy organisations 
(Jordan & Van Tuijl, 2007) that inhibit activists from straying from mainstream discourse. There is 
also evidence that the implicit threat of increased regulation deters INGOs from being candid about 
their failings and pursuing reform efforts. In a survey of environmental INGOs, Jepson found that 
CEOs were apprehensive to open up the debate about accountability in case it would tempt 
governments to ‘respond with knee-jerk, one-size-fits-all regulations that will not do anyone any 
good.’ (2005: 517) The potential penalties for non-compliance are sufficiently grave to ensure that 
legal accountability is strong constraint on INGO behaviour. 
The first wave also encompassed efforts to improve commission accountability, meaning the 
expectation that INGOs will be answerable to agents that have commissioned them to execute a 
task. It differs from fiscal accountability in that the INGO bears responsibilities to the commissioning 
agent, who does not necessarily have to be a donor. Moreover, the boundaries of commission 
accountability are defined by the commissioned task, whether paid for or not; whereas fiscal 
accountability encompasses donations without conditions attached. The extant literature on INGO 
accountability tends to overlook these important distinctions between the source of an 
organisation’s funds.ii The commissioning agent is typically a local/national government or 
multilateral institution, such as the IMF or World Bank. In addition, large businesses can task an 
INGO to audit their corporate social responsibility practices, such as Social Accountability 
Accreditation Services and the Fair Labor Association. INGOs will be expected to produce a written 
report at the conclusion of a project, and often interim reports whilst the project is in progress. 
Possibilities of being granted future contracts will be damaged if the INGO is found to perform 
poorly, as will the professional perception of the INGO as efficient and reliable. The norms of 
commission accountability therefore also tend to be strongly institutionalised in INGO governance. 
First wave accountability mechanisms, then, have thematic similarities. They are engineered to 
satisfy the demands of powerful stakeholders. They are focused on tracking the use of resources, 
and preoccupied with campaign-specific, short-term targets. INGO performance is recorded and 
assessed by experts using quantitative methodologies, and documentation is produced for the 
consumption of the highly literate, who are well-versed in financial jargon and policy terminology. 
The advances of the first wave were essential to help establish the credentials of INGOs as actors of 
probity. However, it emulates a corporate model of accountability that is not always congruent with 
the core norms that distinguish INGOs from other private actors. It does not fully incorporate the 
responsibilities of the INGO to be mindful and responsive to the concerns of the people closest to 
their mission, which supposedly are the organisation’s raison d’être.   
Moreover, first wave accountability discourages the evolution of the INGO as a learning 
organisation. INGOs often conduct highly complex operations that present intimidating logistical 
challenges. A humanitarian relief operation in the aftermath of a natural disaster, for example, will 
require the transport and deployment of foodstuffs, housing materials, medical supplies and aid 
workers within a short time-frame. A multitude of errors can occur in such chaotic circumstances: 
there may be unforeseen delays in aid delivery, fieldworkers may miscalculate the extent of need, 
food may become contaminated, and so on. However, the ‘adrenalin culture’ that develops under 
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pressure to demonstrate results to donors is not conducive to open discussion of failure (Britton, 
2005: 6). The potential repercussions inhibit INGOs ‘from publishing or even sharing lessons learned 
from programme experience.’ (ibid.) INGOs are instead rewarded for conforming (or appearing to 
conform) to narrowly-defined benchmarks that reflect the preferences of powerful stakeholders 
who can impose financial and legal sanctions on the organisation. INGOs have a perverse incentive 
to gloss over their mistakes and avoid critical self-reflection on performance. 
Practitioners and academics helped to raise awareness of these issues, which helped to generate a 
second wave of reforms. The beginnings of this shift can be traced to the period of soul-searching 
amongst humanitarian INGOs that followed the botched relief operation during the 1994 Rwandan 
conflict (Slim, 2002). It is worth restating that different INGOs have followed the reform trajectory at 
different stages. Change across the sector is still ongoing and has thus far been incremental and 
fragmentary.  
 
The Second Wave of Reform 
The second wave of reforms is a departure from a narrowly-conceived notion of accountability to a 
holistic perspective on accountability relationships. INGOs are held primarily accountable to their 
intended ‘beneficiaries’ – the standard term for the individuals and communities that INGOs aim to 
represent and serve. They also bear duties to staff, members, and peer INGOs. The second wave is 
not a wholesale rejection of the first wave model. Financial, legal and commission accountability are 
basic elements of good governance. Rather, it reclaims the mission by rebalancing accountability 
relationships in favour of the least powerful stakeholders. Second wave accountability is designed to 
further the strategic objectives of the INGO as an agent of social change; however, it largely remains 
at the stage of widely-espoused aspirations, rather than widely-observed practice.  
The second wave is inspired by the notions of ‘people-centred development’ (Korten, 1983), 
community empowerment and participatory decision-making. These once radical ideas are now 
touted by institutions such as the World Bank and the OECD, and have become part of development 
orthodoxy. INGOs such as Oxfam and ActionAid have taken the lead in the sector in designing and 
implementing participation techniques amongst beneficiaries (Bryant, 2007; Jordan, 2007). 
Beneficiary participation in the decision-making process is facilitated at various levels, ranging from 
consultations with community leaders, to focus groups and village assemblies. Participatory research 
methodologies, such as social mapping, timelines and ‘well-being’ ranking are used to broaden and 
deepen involvement amongst communities with poor rates of literacy (Narayanasamy, 2009). The 
aim is to maximise inclusivity and enfranchise the most marginalised peoples, who usually have little 
if any input into decisions that affect their lives. These various participatory initiatives can be 
grouped under the term dialogic accountability. The views of beneficiaries help to shape the 
formulation of INGO policy, and to monitor and evaluate impacts and outcomes. INGOs can also 
promote their mission of long-term societal transformation by empowering and enabling people to 
articulate their demands and collaborate to achieve mutual goals. These skills can help to foster 
community self-reliance, which will reap dividends beyond the short-term, campaign-specific 
objectives of the INGO. Dialogic accountability conveys the intention that an INGO and its 
beneficiaries should be nominal equals in debate, despite the obvious power differentials in the 
relationship. It is a preferable term to the more commonly used ‘downwards accountability’, which 
can be seen as implying a unidirectional flow of communication from INGOs to beneficiaries. Dialogic 
accountability helps to reinforce the norm of reciprocity in dialogue, and the responsibility of the 
INGO to be a responsive interlocutor. It is also preferable to the notions of ‘voice’ and ‘exit’ 
accountability (Ebrahim, 2003b: 200, 204), which restricts the rights of the community to make 
complaints or to simply ‘walk away’. Dialogic accountability, in contrast, encourages mutual learning 
and critically reflective practice. In reality, this aspiration is not translated into practice, because the 
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stark disparity of socio-economic status between both parties often distorts the conditions for frank 
and constructive discussion (as discussed in more detail below). 
Second-wave reforms encourage INGOs to embrace failure, as long as lessons are learned to prevent 
the recurrence of mistakes. Beneficiary feedback should assist in diagnosing the causes of 
organisational failure, finding remedies and improving future practice. This is particularly challenging 
to achieve given as INGOs are rather insulated from compelling pressures that prompt change in the 
public and private sector (Ronalds, 2010: 181). Businesses are beholden to their shareholders and 
their consumers. It is easy for the former to evaluate profit-reports, and for the latter to compare 
the quality of products from rival suppliers. It is not so straightforward for INGO donors to 
determine if money is being invested in ways that adhere to the mission, because information may 
be scarce, and measurement of societal impact is notoriously difficult (Oakley, et al., 1998). Similarly, 
elected politicians are expected to be routinely answerable for their actions, and governments can 
be removed from office if the public vote them out. Beneficiaries, in contrast, may have few 
alternatives to the services that the INGO provides, and so it is difficult for them to express 
dissatisfaction by ‘voting with their feet’. INGOs are not subject to popular checks and balances, 
even if they assume quasi-governmental functions. Organisational learning is therefore largely 
dependent upon the willingness of the INGO to be candid about failings, to invite criticism and 
external scrutiny and to be self-reflective about performance. The second-wave approach 
encourages INGOs to be proactive in facilitating external dialogic accountability, even if the 
beneficiaries deliver opinions that do not redound to the INGOs’ credit. This may be considered 
rather ambitious in the context of intense competition for donor resources.  
External dialogic accountability extends to relationships with local partners. Many development 
INGOs have shifted from direct project-implementation to pursuing partnership with Southern 
NGOs; for instance, by providing financial support for capacity-building projects (Lewis, 2007: 184). 
Partnership is popular with bilateral donors, as it is portrayed in development discourse as an 
important element of aid-effectiveness and beneficiary-empowerment (ibid: 185). Although 
‘partnerships’ imply some degree of mutuality, they are often asymmetrical. INGOs ‘have the power 
of funding but also of global knowledge networks and superior communication channels that make 
them feared competitors of local NGOs; their power is often used to set the terms and conditions of 
funding and accountability for their partners.’ (Wallace, et al, 2006: 4-5) Elbers and Arts find that 
Southern NGOs sometimes adopt strategic behaviour to evade the undesirable consequences of 
conditions attached to INGO funds, such as manipulating perceptions of compliance (2011). The 
principles of second wave accountability are thus significantly undermined. Nevertheless, there are 
some good examples of meaningful discourse and mutual learning in the sector (Gaventa, 2004). The 
ICCO in the Netherlands has sought to institutionalise partnership by establishing Regional Councils 
in Africa, Asia and the Americas, which contribute towards policy development. Formal structures 
for policy dialogue, however, remain rare (Brehm, 2001). Dialogic accountability also applies to 
internal INGO relationships.  A recent survey of officials from a broad range of INGOs found that 
accountability responsibilities to the membership are prioritised by 40% of respondents (Piewitt et 
al., 2010: 245). The internet has enabled INGOs to reach out to members by providing more 
information about their activities than ever before. Even NGOs with a relatively small resource-base 
usually sustain a decent website, email distribution list, Facebook page and Twitter feed, all of which 
have the inherent potential to elicit dialogue. Research indicates, however, that Web-based 
platforms tend to be used more for disclosure of financial and performance data, rather than foster 
meaningful communication with members and other stakeholders (Saxton & Guo, 2011). This partly 
reflects depressed demand. Case study evidence suggests that members do not covet a greater role 
in decision-making (O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008: 813). 
Internal dialogic accountability extends to management-staff relations. INGOs are structured along 
hierarchical divisions of line management that characterise any bureaucratic organisation. Tasks are 
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delegated and staff members are accountable to their line managers for their delivery. Performance 
appraisals are routine. The senior management team are held accountable to the Board. The latter 
are chosen through election or via a Nominations Committee, and are removable if they contravene 
codes of conduct. In a survey of leaders from over 150 NGOs, Schmitz et al found that these 
relations of accountability are accorded wide respect in the sector (2011: 10). Over half of the 
respondents identified themselves as accountable to the Board, and over a fifth as accountable to 
staff. 
The final strand of second wave reforms is peer accountability, which refers to voluntary regulatory 
regimes that are populated and financed by INGOs, and are typically administered by an 
independent third party. Peer-regulation regimes emerged in the wake of the furore about the 
infiltration of militia in Rwandan refugee camps (Storey, 1997). Initiatives such as the Sphere Project 
and the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership were designed to encourage INGOs to establish 
consensus about minimum standards and to engage in cross-sectoral dialogue about best practice. 
The regimes range from broadly defined codes of conduct with weak oversight, to formal 
certification schemes with scrupulous reporting requirements. Peer-regulation has helped to 
sponsor a multi-stakeholder approach to accountability; however, Lloyd and de las Casas find that 
with some honourable exceptions, most peer-regulation regimes describe beneficiary accountability 
in an ambiguous way. They argue that this ‘vagueness makes implementation and enforcement 
difficult, and contrasts with the level of detail relating to financial management, reporting and public 
disclosure.’ (2006: 4)  
Second wave accountability is weakly institutionalised in INGO governance, partly because the 
sanctions for non-compliance are not as direct or coercive as those associated with the first wave. 
Dialogic accountability is difficult to sustain when beneficiaries are highly dependent on INGOs, and 
so probably inhibited from speaking with candour. The membership is largely indifferent about the 
intricacies of policy, and so INGOs can avoid scrutiny by communicating through superficial ‘feel 
good’ PR literature that does not encourage deeper engagement with governance. Staff-members 
could resign if they were dissatisfied with the INGOs’ standards of accountability; but this is less 
likely once people have become socialised into institutional norms. Further, peer-regulation regimes 
have little public visibility and sometimes little practical application, and so could be accused of 
merely being an elitist preoccupation (Crack, 2012).  
Nonetheless, the second wave is a welcome departure from the target-obsessed, managerialist 
tenor of the first wave. It has helped to entrench the norm that beneficiary involvement is a 
hallmark of good governance for progressive INGOs. Yet too often second wave rhetoric can fail to 
resemble the reality of accountability practice. The ‘elephant in the room’, according to Edwards, is 
that the pressure on INGOs to respond to economic imperatives and the preferences of powerful 
stakeholders usually prevails over the norms that are championed about accountability to people 
and communities (2008: 49; also Wallace et al., 2006).This paper contends that INGOs need to 
undertake more radical reform to achieve a deep-seated shift in accountability culture. Three 
thematic areas for change must be addressed if INGOs are to become truly mission-led 
organisations: the language of accountability, and the listening and learning capacity of the INGO.     
 
Language: Framing Dialogic Accountability 
Meaningful dialogic accountability is predicated on parties that are nominal equals in debate, 
notwithstanding differences in socio-economic status. In reality, public deliberation is structured by 
gross social inequalities that curtail the capacity of subordinate groups to articulate their grievances 
(Crack, 2008: 32-33). The disparity is evident in the reification of hierarchical relationships in 
accountability discourse. The very word, ‘beneficiary’, speaks volumes about how debates and 
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agendas are framed in subtle ways that favour INGO interests and interpretations. It presupposes 
that people and communities will assuredly benefit from INGO activities, and delegitimises 
alternative narratives about their unhelpful and harmful effects. The tacit assumption that INGOs are 
positive agents of change relieves them of the responsibility to provide robust evidence that their 
activities have benign impacts. The discourse is couched in terms that implicitly inoculate the INGO 
from criticism, even if these effects are unintended by well-meaning proponents who proclaim a 
strong attachment to the mission. Thus, ostensible efforts to enhance accountability are 
fundamentally undermined.  
Another insidious effect of the word ‘beneficiary’ is that it may reinforce the perception of INGOs as 
neo-colonial agents. It has almost missionary connotations, and is suggestive of a hubristic and 
paternalistic attitude. It evokes an image of practitioners who are smug about their supposed 
benevolence, complacent about the value of philanthropy and who anticipate gratitude from the 
recipients. Moreover, the imposed identity of ‘beneficiary’ disempowers people and communities by 
implying passivity and emphasising neediness. A change in the standard terminology of the sector is 
needed to mirror the change in mind-set that was supposed to be inculcated by the second wave.  
The term primary stakeholderiii better reflects the sense that INGO accountability and legitimacy is 
chiefly dependent upon its relationship with the people and communities that it claims to represent 
and serve. All other accountability relationships should be considered subservient to the 
responsibilities that the INGO incurs to primary stakeholders. The term also helps to restore respect 
for their autonomy and dignity. The sector should re-evaluate its use of language elsewhere and 
consider whether it is imbued with vestiges of false certainty about its beneficial impact.  INGOs 
shouldf actively seek validation about the positive nature of their contribution to community life 
from the people they purport to help. The use of less pejorative language facilitates the listening 
process. 
 
Listening: Enabling Meaningful Participation 
The notion of ‘participation’ has totemic significance in second wave discourse. However, this can 
mean that participation is too frequently treated as an ends in itself. It is exceptionally challenging to 
enable meaningful discursive engagement because INGO relationships with primary stakeholders are 
often founded on deeply unequal terms. The increasingly professionalised INGO sector is largely 
staffediv by a well-educated, highly-skilled socio-economic elite (Smith & Jenkins, 2011). Their lives 
are far removed from the realities of primary stakeholders. Senior staff are fully conversant with 
policy discourse, and their jobs will typically require that they routinely articulate their objectives in 
a persuasive way to multiple audiences, such as the public, the media, officials, and their colleagues. 
INGO staff also control the design of participatory exercises: they determine the research questions, 
the methodology, data collection and the representation of outcomes. Two potential problems arise 
as a consequence of this asymmetry in capacity and agenda-setting power.  
First, staff may unintentionally misinterpret the contributions of primary stakeholders, because they 
are insufficiently sensitive to issues of power and cultural difference. Primary stakeholders may be 
loath to criticise INGOs because they are apprehensive about losing aid and services, particularly if 
they are highly dependent upon their support and there are few alternative providers. There is also 
evidence to suggest that ‘members of poor communities sometimes lack the self-esteem to act 
assertively’ (Burger & Owens, 2010: 1264) and that they find it difficult to ‘make their voices heard’ 
in forums which are culturally biased against their vernacular and non-literate forms of expression. 
The problem is particularly acute for discriminated groups within communities, based on gender, 
disability, sexual preference, ethnicity, caste, and religious belief. Gujit and Shah have criticised the 
tendency to idealise the ‘community’ as cohesive and harmonious, since it conceals power relations 
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and divergent interests (1998: 8). Marginalised groups live within political and social structures that 
limit their capacity for full and equal participation in decision-making. INGOs could compound these 
discriminations if they make poor choices of participants in consultation exercises. They should 
certainly not uncritically accept the views of professed ‘community leaders’ as representative of 
wider feeling in the community. However, mere equitable representation of sub-community groups 
is not sufficient for inclusive dialogue. Consultations need to be carefully designed to create a space 
where participants are equally enabled and empowered to articulate their concerns. Research has 
consistently shown, for example, that there are significant gender differences in contributions to 
exercises that superficially appear to be participatory (ibid.). 
Second, it might be in the self-interest of staff to misrepresent the views of primary stakeholders if 
they cast the INGO in an unflattering light. Negative feedback could potentially damage future fund-
raising prospects, and have professional consequences for under-performing staff-members. INGOs 
need to be sensitive to the potential disjuncture between the normative aspirations of the mission 
and the conditions that promote organisational survival. This demands critical reflection on difficult 
ethical questions about the extent to which INGOs are dependent upon the dependence of primary 
stakeholders, notwithstanding mission rhetoric about empowerment and self-reliance. INGOs have 
been criticised for ‘franchising global brands instead of supporting authentic expressions of 
indigenous civil society, and crowding out Southern participation in knowledge-creation and 
advocacy in order to increase their own voice and profile.’ (Edwards, 2008: 47) INGOs could be seen 
to have an interest in curbing the voices and activism of primary stakeholders in order to protect 
their ‘turf’. There are risks that processes that are nominally participatory are framed in a way to 
elicit findings that validate the self-perception of the INGO as a necessary presence. INGO staff may 
therefore effectively ‘police’ the boundaries of participation, but not necessarily in premeditated 
way. On the contrary, it may occur through unconscious behaviours by well-meaning individuals who 
have not been trained in critical reflective practice. 
Covert agendas can thus render ‘participation’ as little more than a façade that lends a misleading 
aura of authenticity to decisions that are actually taken in a top-down, exclusionary manner. The 
tension between two parties in a profoundly unequal relationship cannot be entirely eradicated. The 
effects can be mitigated, however, and an important first step is for staff to disabuse themselves of 
naïve belief that participation is a panacea for primary stakeholder accountability. The organisation 
should actively engender debate about practical ways to ensure that it is more inclusive and 
receptive to stakeholder feedback, which should involve community consultation and researchers 
trained in participatory methodologies. Each staff-member should also be obliged to undertake 
periodic critical reflection on these issues. Tools could be developed to encourage staff to map out 
the multidimensionality of power relations and to reflect upon their own role in navigating, and 
perhaps unintentionally reproducing, these power disparities. The well-managed INGO will ensure 
that processes of listening and reflection are translated into organisational learning for improved 
practice. 
 
Learning: Completing the Feedback Loop 
A highly competitive funding environment provides perverse incentives for INGOs to be defensive 
about their shortcomings, rather than embrace honest assessments of their performance and seek 
remedial strategies. Instances of failure actually present the most valuable opportunities for critical 
self-reflection and organisational learning.  Britton reports that this potential for growth is not being 
successfully exploited across the sector; indeed, ‘many NGOs admit that they suffered from a lack of 
organisational memory that bordered on clinical amnesia.’ (2005: 7)  There is little point in listening 
to feedback unless it is mobilised to diagnose the reasons for failure and to leverage change. INGOs 
need management procedures in place to induce staff to respond to feedback, but such a profound 
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cultural shift in accountability practice is unlikely to be achieved without external pressure. Burger 
and Owens warn that their findings ‘caution against an over-reliance on reported information when 
regulating, monitoring, or surveying NGOs. They also emphasize the value of third-party monitoring 
and regulation.’ (2010: 1274) Independent evaluation of INGO performance needs to be enhanced 
through strengthened peer-regulation regimes, and sufficiently strong sanctions put in place for 
serious non-compliance. Even regulation mechanisms that have rigorous reporting requirements, 
like the INGO Accountability Charter, do not contain provisions for complaints and redress. Greater 
use could be made of volunteer ombudsmen in this respect, perhaps drawing on independent 
academic experts, or renowned practitioners in retirement who are not seen to have a vested 
interest in adjudication.  
Sanctions should be deployed judiciously, or peer accountability will not foster an atmosphere of 
greater openness. INGOs guilty of grievous misconduct should face some form of reprimand to 
uphold public confidence in the integrity of peer-regulation. However, regulators have a role to play 
in educating donors about likelihood of failure in the kinds of high-risk environments where INGOs 
operate. They could also positively reinforce ‘good behaviour’ by commending INGOs that represent 
the best examples of organisational learning. Perhaps the introduction of a ‘gold standard’ award 
could help to raise aspirations across the sector for better practice. NGOs that win the prize could be 
granted the right to display a symbol of the award in their campaigns literature. It would help INGOs 
to sustain their funding base by burnishing their accountability credentials to their donors, and also 
contribute to the greater good of raising public awareness about peer-regulation.  
Insular attitudes are one of the greatest obstacles to critical self-reflection and organisational 
learning. Coates and David have detailed the ‘obsession of many NGOs with assessing the impact of 
their own organisation in isolation from others.’ (2002: 534) They argue that ‘[w]hile this may be 
important for institutional profile, such measures can encourage competitive rather than 
collaborative behaviour, providing incentives for campaigners to elevate their own profile over 
others…’ (ibid.) This might be remedied by supplementing formal peer accountability with 
networking opportunities. INGOs could extend reciprocal invitations to staff from peer INGOs to 
attend events such as policy meetings, AGMs and primary stakeholder participatory exercises. The 
sector has also been slow to exploit the networking potential of the internet. Launched in January 
2011, Admittingfailure.com aims to address this gap by encouraging honest accounts of 
underperformance from development professionals in a spirit of transparency and mutual learning. 
Even the most informal interactions may help staff to internalise norms of accountability, and so 
assist transformation in accountability culture. 
Critically reflective accountability is fraught with intimidating challenges, but it is not hopelessly 
unrealistic. ActionAid have been at the forefront of important innovations in critically reflective 
practice that are widely admired by other humanitarian and development agencies. Their ‘Action, 
Learning and Planning System’ (ALPS) is designed to explicitly privilege accountability to primary 
stakeholders at all stages of the policy process (ActionAid International, 2011). ALPS heavily 
emphasises organisational learning through a regular cycle of evaluation and appraisals conducted in 
partnership with local peoples. Rather than rely on standardised evaluation criteria, it draws largely 
upon rich personal testimonials and vignettes, which allow aid programmes to be judged in relation 
to the unique challenges posed by the local context. In communities where there is a high degree of 
illiteracy, data is gathered through creative participatory techniques such as drama, music and art. 
These consultations are rather demanding in scope, and potentially entail opportunity-costs in staff 
time and resources. However, ALPS avoids an overly-bureaucratic approach by devolving 
accountability responsibilities as much as possible to those closest to the ground (ibid.). Individual 
aid workers are required to personally reflect on how disparities of power impinge upon the NGOs’ 
relationship with communities, in an attempt to prompt changes in attitudes and behaviours that 
help embed the principles of reflective accountability at all levels of the organisation. The 
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introduction of ALPS has not been trouble-free (Scott-Villiers, 2002). It has been criticised for weak 
organisational development support, and concerns have been raised that progress is undermined by 
pressure from donors to demonstrate outcomes (David & Mancini, 2004). Implementation of the 
programme has been uneven because some staff were ill-informed about the changes or failed to 
fully engage with the ALPS agenda (ActionAid, 2007). Nonetheless, ALPS has been commended in 
sector-wide surveys as representing excellent practice (Blagescu & Lloyd, 2006: 8).  
 
Conclusion 
INGO accountability has undergone a metamorphosis over recent decades. There has been a gradual 
evolution from an accountability model narrowly framed around the demands of powerful 
stakeholders, to a more holistic approach that puts the rights of so-called ‘beneficiaries’ at the helm. 
This paper has aimed to contribute towards the theory of INGO accountability by proposing a 
typology for different relationships of accountability. It has introduced a category of ‘commission 
accountability’ to distinguish between funding sources – a distinction that tends to be collapsed or 
ignored in the extant literature. It has also sought to promote the principles of critically reflective 
accountability by introducing the concept of ‘dialogic accountability’, which emphasises the 
responsibility of the INGO to strive for maximal inclusivity in community consultations, and to be 
responsive to views that are aired. It has also suggested that INGOs should seek to embed critically 
reflective accountability through the three ‘Ls’. Words like ‘beneficiary’ should be expunged from 
the language of accountability, since it is encoded with norms that implicitly undermine the rights of 
primary stakeholders to expect that INGOs should be answerable for their actions. Listening to 
marginalised primary stakeholders is facilitated by inclusive discursive arenas that enable and 
empower people ‘to speak and be heard’. Further, INGOs need to use feedback to become a 
learning organisation, and collaborate with peers to engender a culture of reflective learning across 
the sector.  
The risks inherent in critically reflective accountability should not be underestimated. Exposure of 
organisational failure is highly likely to lead to negative publicity, which could provide fodder for 
adversaries to launch political attacks that result in lasting reputational damage. Critically reflective 
accountability is labour-intensive. The time spent on eliciting primary stakeholder participation and 
evaluating performance could otherwise be spent on fundraising, advocacy or service delivery. 
Further, Bryant notes that INGOs may feel compelled to underplay the amount they spend on 
activities unrelated to their grassroots work: ‘Those who want the greatest accountability…are not 
necessarily those private contributors writing their Christmas checks…It increases the overhead – 
and annual appeals have to point to low, not rising overheads.’ (2007: 180)  It is worth reiterating 
that not all INGOs advocate socially and politically progressive goals, or exhibit interest in enhancing 
their accountability. Ironically, INGOs that shield their misdemeanours from the public gaze could 
profit in comparison with INGOs of greater integrity that are willing to brave the consequences of 
transparency.  
The short-term risks of critically reflective accountability are arguably outweighed by the long-term 
investment in the ethical credibility of progressive INGOs.  INGOs will be seen as disingenuous if they 
allow accountability to be distorted by the demands of powerful stakeholders; or if they exploit 
opportunities to court good publicity by overemphasising success. Progressive INGOs must 
endeavour to stay true to their mission by maintaining a robust defence of their moral capital. A 
deep-seated shift in accountability culture is achievable if the sector intensifies collaboration to raise 
standards and engender mutual learning. Critically reflective accountability could help endow 
progressive INGOs with the moral authority to promote societal transformation.  
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i
 The ‘mission’ is the fundamental strategic objective of the organisation.  
ii
 For example, Ebrahim (2003b) separates NGOs stakeholders into three primary groups: sector regulators, 
clients and communities, and ‘funders’. Although he admits that this is a deliberate simplification, I argue 
that the latter category is too broad to be analytically useful, and introduce the concept of ‘commission 
accountability’ as a corrective. It is worth also noting that Ebrahim’s model of accountability does not 
recognise crucial actors such as staff-members and peer and partner organisations. 
iii
 A small number of INGOs such as Oxfam and Care International refer to ‘primary stakeholders’ in their 
literature, but even here it is still used interchangeably with the standard term of ‘beneficiaries’. 
iv
 ‘Staff’ encompasses paid and unpaid personnel. 
